A family office can have an investment committee, a policy and clear limits on paper. The test comes when the founder wants to move quickly, exceed a limit, or treat a related-party opportunity differently. If everyone waits for the founder to approve the exception, the control is not a control; it records the founder’s preference.
Consider an illustrative case: a principal proposes investing in a family member’s company, although policy requires independent review. The control question is whether the conflict is identified, someone can pause review, and the rationale is recorded. This is hypothetical, not a client account.
Separate three decisions before a proposal arrives: who may recommend the investment, who approves it (including exceptions), and who verifies execution against the approved terms. A small office may combine roles, but it should disclose that arrangement and route conflicts around the interested person.
Do not confuse family influence with legal authority. A family charter, investment policy or committee terms may express an agreed process, but they do not automatically amend a company’s constitution or statutory duties. If a company makes the investment, its directors remain subject to the law and duties in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, section 157 of Singapore’s Companies Act 1967 sets duties for company directors and officers; it does not create a general family veto procedure. Obtain jurisdiction-specific advice before translating a family protocol into binding company action.
The practical safeguard is a pre-agreed escalation path: disclose the conflict; exclude the affected person from the decision where appropriate; assign an independent reviewer; state the decision threshold; record the rationale; and check implementation. A founder may retain reserved powers. The boundary should be known before the difficult case, not improvised after pressure begins.
The OECD’s 2023 Principles describe board responsibilities for monitoring management, risk and conflicts, and objective judgement. The IFC Family Business Governance Handbook distinguishes governance structures for family, ownership and business. This guidance is not universal law for private family offices. It frames the question: who decides on this asset, for whose benefit, and with what review?
Take the last material exception and trace it from request to execution. Who raised the conflict? Could the affected person stop the review? Who approved it? Where are the reasons recorded? Who confirmed execution matched the approval? If the answer is “we will decide when it happens”, authority is not yet fully designed.
What to check
Trace one recent exception from request to execution:
- Who disclosed the conflict?
- Who had authority to pause or approve?
- Where is the rationale recorded?
- Who checked that implementation matched the approval?
Sources and scope
This is an operational governance analysis, not legal advice. The OECD and IFC materials are governance guidance, not rules for every private family office. Singapore section 157 applies to company directors and officers within its scope; it does not establish family veto rights.
- IFC Family Business Governance HandbookInternational Finance Corporation, 2011
- G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2023, Chapter VOECD, 2023
- Companies Act 1967, section 157Singapore Statutes Online; current version checked 11 November 2026

